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The Lost Profits Measure of Damages in Price
Enhancement Cases
Jeffrey L. Harrison*
I. INTRODUCTION
In private antitrust actions involving price fixing or other
methods of price enhancement,1 courts generally use the illegal
overcharge measure of damages. The illegal overcharge is the
difference between the illegally enhanced price and the price
that would have prevailed in the absence of the illegal conduct,
multiplied by the volume of the good purchased by the plain-
tiff.2 In 1968, the United States Supreme Court ruled that a de-
fendant cannot escape liability for the full amount of an illegal
overcharge by showing that the plaintiff purchaser has either
partially or completely passed on the overcharge to indirect
purchasers. 3 More recently, the Court, largely in the interest of
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Houston College of Law.
1. For convenience, price fixing will be used throughout this Article as a
general example of the type of price enhancement case in which illegal over-
charge is used as the measure of damages. Of course, the illegal overcharge
remedy is available in a variety of other price enhancement situations includ-
ing monopolization, see, e.g., Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp.,
392 U.S. 481 (1968), and refusals to deal, see, e.g., Straus v. Victor Talking Mach.
Co., 297 F. 791 (2d Cir. 1924). For a summary of the various damage measures
that are employed in antitrust cases, see Guilfoil, Damage Determination in
'Private Antitrust Suits, 42 NoTRE DAmE LAw. 647, 675-76 (1967).
2. See Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390,
396 (1906).
3. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968).
The Court explained that the gross overcharge measure is grounded in tradi-
tional legal doctrine:
The general tendency of the law, in regard to damages at least, is not to
go beyond the first step. As it does not attribute remote consequences
to a defendant so it holds him liable if proximately the plaintiff has suf-
fered a loss. The plaintiffs suffered losses to the amount of the verdict
when they paid [the illegal price]. Their claim accrued at once in the
theory of the law and it does not inquire into later events .... The
[defendant] ought not to be allowed to retain his illegal profit, and the
only one who can take it from him is the one that alone was in relation
to him, and from whom the [defendant] took the sum.
Id. at 490 n.8 (quoting Southern Pac. Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245
U.S. 531, 533-34 (1918)).
The Hanover Shoe Court also identified several practical reasons for using
the gross overcharge measure in price enhancement cases. First, since a wide
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consistency, held that indirect purchasers cannot use the "pass
on" theory as a basis for recovering damages from remote pro-
ducers.4
The effect of these decisions has been threefold. First,
commentators have begun to examine the problem of appor-
tioning overcharge damages among the various levels of the
vertical production chain through which a good passes.5 Sec-
ond, a vigorous debate has ensued over the merits of the pass-
on defense and indirect-purchaser standing.6 Finally, legisla-
tion has been introduced that would allow assertion of the
pass-on defense and recoveries by indirect purchasers.7
This activity seems premised on the mistaken notion that
practical considerations and antitrust policy require the use of
either a gross or pass-on adjusted overcharge measure of dam-
range of factors influence a company's pricing policies, the Court believed that
the impact of a single change in the relevant factors could not be isolated and
measured after the fact. 392 U.S. at 492. Second, the Court observed that aban-
doning the gross overcharge measure for the pass-on adjusted measure would
leave plaintiffs "the nearly insuperable difficulty of demonstrating" that they
could not or would not have raised prices absent the overcharge. Id. at 493.
Third, the Court complained that the pass-on adjusted overcharge measure was
difficult to apply in the "real economic world" in which elasticities of demand
cannot be determined so readily as in "an economist's hypothetical modeL" Id.
Finally, the Court expressed concern that if it were to recognize the pass-on de-
fense, "[t]reble damage actions would often require additional long and compli-
cated proceedings involving massive evidence and complicated theories." Id.
4. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977).
5. See Cirarce, Price Fixing, Privity, and the Pass-On Problem in Antitrust
Treble-Damage Suits: A Suggested Solution, 19 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 171 (1977);
Schaefer, Passing-on Theory in Antitrust Treble Damage Actions: An Economic
and Legal Analysis, 16 WM. & MARY I. REv. 883 (1975). See generally E. TD4-
BERLAKE, FEDERAL TREBLE DAMAGE ANTrrRUST AcTIONs 302-57 (1965); Gibbons,
The "Market Share" Theory of Damages in Private Enforcement Cases, 18 ANTi-
TRUST BULL. 743 (1973); Hoyt, Dahl & Gibson, Comprehensive Models for Assess-
ing Lost Profits to Antitrust Plaintiffs, 60 MmN. I. REV. 1233 (1976); Lanzillotti,
Problems of Proof of Damages in Antitrust Suits, 16 ANTrrRusT BULL. 329
(1971); Parker, Economics in the Courtroom: Proof of Damages in a Price-Fix-
ing Case, 9 ANTiTrrUsT L. & EcoN. REV. No. 4, at 61 (1977); Parker, Measuring
Damages in Federal Treble Damage Actions, 17 ArrrrusT BULL. 497 (1972).
6. See, e.g., Beane, Antitrust: Standing and Passing-On, 26 BAYLOR L.
REV. 331 (1974); Cirarce, supra note 5; Handler, Antitrust-1978, 78 CoLU. L.
REV. 1363 (1978); Harris & Sullivan, Passing On the Monopoly Overcharge: A
Comprehensive Policy Analysis, 128 U. PA. I. REV. 269 (1979); McGuire, The
Passing-On Defense and the Right of Remote Purchasers to Recover Treble Dam-
ages Under Hanover Shoe, 33 U. Prrr. L. REV. 177 (1971); Pollack, Automatic
Treble Damages and the Passing-On Defense: The Hanover Shoe Decision, 13
ANTITRUST BuLL. 1183 (1968); Watson, Bad Economics in the Antitrust Court-
room: Illinois Brick and the 'Pass-On Problem, 9 ANTrRUST I & ECON. REV.
No. 4, at 69 (1977); Note, Denial of Standing to Private, Noncommercial Consum-
ers Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 31 VANn. L. REV. 1531 (1978).
7. See S. 300, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CoNG. REc. S908-914 (1979); S. 1874,
95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CoNG. REC. S12019 (1977).
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ages in price enhancement cases. In fact, use of the gross over-
charge measure is an unnecessary accommodation to the
practical problems involved in proving damages and it tends to
compensate victims in a manner that is inconsistent with the
actual losses they have suffered. Moreover, the overcharge
measure, even if modified by a pass-on defense and standing
for indirect purchasers, ignores the damages resulting from the
decrease in volume brought on by the enhanced price.8
This Article contends that lost profits rather than gross
overcharge or pass-on adjusted overcharge is the most appro-
priate measure of damages in price enhancement cases be-
cause it accurately compensates victims while retaining the
deterrent effect of the potential treble-damage action. In addi-
tion, use of the lost profits measure eliminates the practical
problem of apportioning an overcharge fund among direct and
indirect purchasers. The Article demonstrates that in many
price enhancement cases, the lost profits measure would be a
highly practical method of calculating damages. Part II briefly
traces the development of current judicial attitudes toward an-
titrust damages in general, as well as toward the special case of
illegal overcharge. Part IT consists of a microeconomic analy-
sis of the differences between the overcharge and lost profits
measures, with special attention paid to the imprecision of the
overcharge measure. Finally, Part IV demonstrates that there
is a practicable method of calculating lost profits by a statistical
technique-multivariate regression analysis-which is not sus-
ceptible to the practical problems of the pass-on adjusted over-
charge. The Article suggests that f a lost profits rather than a
gross overcharge measure of damages were used in price en-
hancement cases, there would be little reason for denying
standing to indirect purchasers.9
I1. DEVELOPMENT OF THE OVERCHARGE MEASURE
OF DAMAGES
Since the damage a business suffers when it is the victim
of an illegal overcharge is ultimately reflected either as a de-
cline in current profits or as a lost opportunity for future prof-
its, the effective enforcement of antitrust laws hinges on the
willingness of courts to compensate victims at least for their
lost profits. Indeed, the language of section 7 of the Sherman
8. See pp. 770-72 infra.
9. See text accompanying notes 119-129 infra.
190]
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ActiO and its successor, section 4 of the Clayton Act," indicates
that Congress intended courts to apply some compensatory
measure of damages in private antitrust cases. The legislative
history of these sections reveals, however, that Congress did
not address the problem of measuring the damages sustained
by victims of anticompetitive activity.12 Evidently, Congress
expected that this problem would be solved by the courts.13
Because of this lack of legislative guidance, the early pros-
pects for private enforcement of the antitrust laws were not
particularly encouraging.' 4 Courts began simply to transfer the
restrictive common law attitude toward claims for lost profits to
10. Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 209 (repealed 1955). Section 7 of
the Sherman Act had provided.
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by any
other person or corporation by reason of anything forbidden or de-
clared to be unlawful by this act, may sue therefor in any circuit court
of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is
found, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover
threefold the damages by him sustained, and the costs of suit, includ-
ing a reasonable attorney's fee.
(emphasis added).
11. Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in
any district court of the United States in the district in which the de-
fendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the
amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him
sustained, and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's
fee.
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976) (emphasis added).
12. The earliest discussions in Congress centered primarily on the consti-
tutionality of an "anti-trust" bill in light pf the commerce clause. See, e.g., 20
CONG. REc. 1167-69, 1457-62 (1889). It does not appear that an appropriate meas-
ure of the quantum of damages was ever discussed in either the House or the
Senate prior to the enactment of the Sherman Act. See id. passim; 21 CONG.
REC. passim (1890). See generally W. THORNTON, A TREATISE ON THE SHERMAN
ANTI-TRUST ACT 1-33 (1913); 1 H. TOULMIN, A TREATISE ON THE ANTI-TRUST LAwS
OF THE UNITED STATES 1-21 (1949). The same appears to be true for the Clayton
Act. Although there was some congressional discussion of remedial measures
insofar as .they concerned the effectiveness of the Sherman Act, see, e.g., 51
CONG. REC. 15826 (1914), the question of the proper measure of damages was
not addressed. See id. passim. See generally K. ELZINGA & W. BRErr, THE ANTI-
TRUST PENALTIES: A STUDY IN LAw AND ECONOICS 63-77 (1976).
13. See generally M. HANDLER, ANTITRUST IN PERSPECTIVE (1957).
14. The case of Howard v. Stillwell & Bierce Mfg. Co., 139 U.S. 199 (1891),
was decided one year after the Sherman Act became law. Although Howard
did not involve an antitrust claim, it exemplified the attitude of the Court to-
ward damages based on lost profits. In Howard, which was an action for the
price of milling machinery, the Court affIrmed a lower court's decision not to
recognize as a setoff a claim for profits lost due to a delay in delivery. Id. at
207-08. Justice Lamar relied on the traditional rationale that "expected profits
are too dependent upon numerous, uncertain and changing contingencies to
constitute a definite and trustworthy measure of actual damages ... ." Id. at
206. See also Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
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antitrust cases. One of the first and probably most widely cited
cases's illustrating this judicial response is Central Coal & Coke
Co. v. Hartman,16 in which the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit refused to award damages based on a lost profits theory
because the claim was too speculative.' 7 The Hartman court
required that the evidence of lost profits be sufficient to meet
the traditional "reasonable certainty" requirement of the com-
mon law:
Facts must be proved, data must be given which form a rational basis
for a reasonably correct estimate of the nature of the legal injury and
of the amount of the damages which resulted from it, before a judg-
ment of recovery can be lawfully rendered. These are fundamental
principles of the law of damages. Now, the anticipated profits of a busi-
ness are generally so dependent upon numerous and uncertain contin-
gencies that their amount is not susceptible of proof with any
reasonable degree of certainty; hence the general rule that the ex-
pected profits of a commercial business are too remote, speculative,
and uncertain to warrant a judgment for their loss. 18
It is likely that decisions such as Hartman seriously retarded
the early development of the private antitrust action as a deter-
rent to anticompetitive activity.' 9 The knowledge that one
could prove all the elements of an offense and still not recover
because of the high degree of certainty required for proving the
quantum of damages certainly must have discouraged potential
plaintiffs.
Courts responded to this problem in two ways. First, re-
gardless of the type of anticompetitive activity at issue, they re-
laxed the degree of certainty required for proving damages. 20
Second, when the specific activity at issue was price enhance-
15. See, e.g., Clark, The Treble Damage Bonanza: New Doctrines of Dam-
ages in Private Antitrust Suits, 52 MxcH. L. Rav. 363, 367 (1954); Donovan & Ir-
vine, Proof of Damages Under the Anti-Trust Law, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 511, 513 n.7
(1940); Guilfoil, supra note 1, at 647.
16. 111 F. 96 (8th Cir. 1901).
17. Id. at 98. Among the cases cited by the Hartman court was Howard v.
Stillwell & Bierce Mfg. Co., 139 U.S. 199 (1891). See note 14 supra.
18. 111 F. at 98. For similar holdings, see Alexander Milburn Co. v. Union
Carbide & Carbon Corp. 15 F.2d 678, 684 (4th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 757
(1927); American Sea Green Slate Co. v. O'Halloran, 229 F. 77, 79 (2d Cir. 1915);
Locker v. American Tobacco Co., 218 F. 447, 450 (2d Cir. 1914); Loder v. Jayne,
142 F. 1010, 1019-23 (E.D. Pa. 1906).
19. See Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J. L. &
EcoN. 365, 373-74 (1970). There were only 158 treble damage cases reported in
the period 1890-1939, id. at 371, and damage awards were made in 33. Guilfoil,
supra note 1, at 647 n.1. See also Note, Fifty Years of Sherman Act Enforce-
ment, 49 YALE L.J. 284, 296-98 (1939).
20. This trend has received considerable attention in the literature. See
sources cited in note 15 supra; McConnell, The Treble Damage Action, 1950 U.
I.Ti L, F. 659, 664; Weinberg, Recent Trends in Antitrust Civil Action Damage
Determinations, 1976 DuKE 1.J. 485.
1980]
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ment, courts consistently allowed recoveries based on the gross
overcharge 2' instead of lost profits. The advantage to plaintiffs
of using a gross overcharge measure is that it is less specula-
tive and therefore easier to prove than lost profits.2 2 Both of
these developments have been documented in the literature,23
but it is worthwhile to review them as a prelude to the eco-
nomic analysis that follows in Part HI of this Article.
A. THE DEGREE OF CERTAINTY REQUIRED IN PROVING LOST
PROFITS
While it is clear that courts now apply a relaxed standard
of proof to lost profits claims in antitrust suits, 24 the view of the
Hartman court prevailed until the mid-1920s. For example, in
Thomson v. Cayser,25 reportedly the first antitrust "lost profits"
case to reach the Supreme Court,26 the Court approved the
21. See, e.g., Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968);
Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743 (1947); North Tex. Pro-
ducers Ass'n v. Young, 308 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 929
(1963); Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1961),
cert. dismissed, 371 U.S. 801 (1962); Gus Blass Co. v. Elizabeth Arden Sales
Corp., 150 F.2d 988 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 773 (1945); Ohio Valley Elec.
Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 244 F. Supp. 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Philadelphia Elec.
Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 1964 Trade Cas. 71,123 (E.D. Pa. 1964). See
also Guilfoil, supra note 1, at 662-65.
22. Allowing plaintiffs to recover damages based on the gross overcharge
theory relieves them of a substantial burden of proof, since they need prove
only the amount of the overcharge. See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
ANTTrnUST § 251, at 785 (1977). When a plaintiff proceeds under a loss of net
profits theory, he normally must prove from his records the actual profit exper-
ienced during the damage period and a basis for estimating what his profit
would have been without the violation. See id. § 251, at 786. Under the doctrine
of Hartman, see text accompanying note 18 supra, the task of estimating what
profits would have been in the absence of anticompetitive conduct was far
more difficult than proving the amount of an illegal overcharge. Today, the
overcharge method of calculating damages persists even though the doctrine of
Hartman has been discarded, see text accompanying notes 24-42 infra, and
courts now give plaintiffs "wide latitude" in proving lost profits. See L. SUI-
VAN, supra, § 251, at 786-87.
23. See generally sources cited in notes 15, 20 supra
24. See, e.g., Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946); East-
man Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927). See also L.
SuLLIvAN, supra note 22, § 251, at 786-87.
25. 243 U.S. 66 (1917). The defendants in Thomsen were shipowners who
maintained a practice of returning part of their collusively determined rate to
those shippers who dealt exclusively with the rate-fixing group. Id. at 69-72.
Since the defendants offered service only along the most lucrative routes, ship-
pers were placed in the difficult position of foregoing the shipment of goods to
ports not on the defendants' routes or of losing the discounted rate by shipping
on other lines.
26. See Donovan & Irvine, supra note 15, at 518.
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trial judge's submission of the damages issue to the jury,2 7 but
appeared to do so because the jury had been given a Hadley v.
Baxendale instruction-no speculative damages were to be
awarded.2 8 The plaintiffs overcame this burden by tracing their
damages to the loss of specific customers.2 9 The Supreme
Court also noted that the plaintiffs' "lost profit" claim was
equal to the amount of the defendants' illegal overcharges.3 0
This factor may have been particularly important because prior
to Thomsen the Court had responded favorably to the over-
charge measure of damages. 3 1
Perhaps the first sign that the Court was beginning to
change its position on the proof of damages issue came in Ke-
ogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway.32 While the Keogh
Court observed in dictum that the alleged damages were
"purely speculative,"33 it went on to state a rule that was un-
doubtedly a departure from Hartman. Instead of alluding to
the "relative certainty" requirement, Justice Brandeis indicated
that damages resulting from anticompetitive activity could be
proved "by facts from which their existence is logically and le-
gally inferable."34
However one interprets the language in Keogh, a marked
relaxation of proof requirements for the quantum of antitrust
damages came in 1927 with Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern
Photo Materials Co.35 In Eastman Kodak several of the facts
27. 243 U.S. at 89.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390
(1906).
32. 260 U.S. 156 (1922). The defendant rail companies in Keogh had agreed
to uniform tariffs which were then approved as reasonable and nondiscrimina-
tory by the Interstate Commerce Commission. The issue in the case was
whether a manufacturer who shipped with these rail companies could, in a pri-
vate action for damages under section 7 of the Sherman Act, challenge the
rates as conspiratorially fixed. The Court, per Justice Brandeis, held that the
injury to business or property required under section 7 implied the violation of
a legal right, and that no such violation existed since the shipper's rights
against the carrier were defined by the published tariff. Id. at 163.
33. Id. at 164. At a later point in his opinion, Justice Brandeis, citing Cen-
tral Coal & Coke Co. v. Hartman, 111 F. 96 (8th Cir. 1901), noted that the facts
from which damages may be proved "cannot be supplied by conjecture." 260
U.S. at 165.
34. 260 U.S. at 165. This interpretation of Keogh is contrary to that
presented by another commentator who cites Keogh as supporting the tradi-
tional rule. See Clark, supra note 15, at 370, 389.
35. 273 U.S. 359 (1927). The plaintiff in Eastman Kodak was a dealer in
photographic supplies who purchased merchandise from Kodak. Prior to 1910,
Kodak had acquired most of the plaintiff's competitors and had even attempted
1980]
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that the Court had found essential for permitting the recovery
of "lost profits" in Thomsen were missing. First, the lost profits
claimed were not traced directly to specific customers. 36 Sec-
ond, the jury had not received a strict Hadley v. Baxendale in-
struction.37 While it had been told that damages could not be
determined by "mere speculation or guess," the jury was also
instructed that damages could be determined on the basis of
evidence "furnishing data from which the amount of probable
loss could be ascertained as a matter of reasonable infer-
ence."3 8 Finally, the claim in Eastman Kodak was for lost prof-
its, not for the amount of an illegal overcharge.3 9
In approving the instructions of the trial judge, the East-
man Kodak Court reasoned that "a defendant whose wrongful
conduct has rendered difficult the ascertainment of the precise
damages suffered. . . is not entitled to complain that [the dam-
ages] cannot be measured with the same exactness and preci-
sion as would otherwise be possible."40 The just and
reasonable inference standard for measuring lost profits ap-
plied by the Eastman Kodak Court4l has retained its vitality
and, perhaps, become even more liberal.4 2
to acquire the plaintiff's business. The plaintiff refused Kodak's offer, and Ko-
dak began charging the plaintiff retail prices instead of prices reflecting a
dealer's discount. Id. at 368-69.
36. Instead, the plaintiff employed a very general "before and after" dam-
age theory, see text accompanying notes 132-140 infra, which set lost profits at a
figure equal to the plaintiff's gross profits in the four years preceding the dam-
age period less the additional expenses it had incurred in handling the defend-
ant's goods during the four-year damage period. 273 U.S. at 376.
37. The defendant, citing Central Coal & Coke Co. v. Hartman, 111 F. 96
(8th Cir. 1901), argued that plaintiff had not met the reasonable certainty re-
quirement for proving damages. 273 U.S. at 376-77.
38. Id. at 379.
39. Id. at 369.
40. Id. at 379.
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100
(1969); Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946). In Bigelow, the
plaintiffs attempted to recover damages alleged to have been caused by the de-
fendant's refusal to allow plaintiffs access to films for first-run exhibition. Id. at
253-54. The plaintiffs sought to prove the quantum of damages by contrasting
their profits earned prior to the violation to those earned during the violation,
id. at 258, and also by comparing their profits with those of a similar theatre
which had been allowed access to films before the plaintiffs. Id. at 257-58. In
holding that proof of the quantum of lost profits was sufficient, the Court ex-
plained:
[W]here the defendant by his own wrong has prevented a more precise
computation, the jury may not render a verdict based on speculation or
guesswork. But the jury may make a just and reasonable estimate of
the damage based on relevant data ....
The most elementary conceptions of justice and public policy re-
[Vol. 64:751
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B. THE "OVERCHARGE" MEASURE OF DAMAGES
Despite the relaxed standard that courts now apply to
proof of lost profits, the illegal overcharge measure of damages
is still used in price-fixing and other price enhancement cases.
As already noted,43 an allegation of overcharge damages sub-
stantially alleviates the problems of proof that had plagued
early private enforcement efforts in which lost profits were al-
leged. One commentator has suggested that the overcharge
measure was the product of imaginative pleading necessitated
by cases such as Hartman.44 While this may be true in price
enhancement cases involving refusals to deal,45 it seems more
likely that the measure evolved from the common law claim for
money had and received.4 6
Regardless of its origin, the use of illegal overcharge as the
measure of damages in price enhancement cases was estab-
lished early. The Supreme Court first applied the overcharge
measure of damages in Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v.
City of Atlanta.4 7 While Chattanooga Foundry has been cited
as the case in which the Court initially rejected the pass-on de-
fense,48 it actually appears merely to have fixed a stamp of ap-
proval on a measure of damages that equals "the difference
quire that the wrongdoer shall bear the risk of the uncertainty which
"his own wrong has created.
Id. at 264-65. In addition to relaxing the standard for proving the quantum of
damages, courts have relaxed the standards for proving causation and the
"fact" of damage. See Weinberg, supra note 20, at 488-95.
43. See note 22 and text accompanying note 21 supra.
44. See Guilfoil, supra note 1, at 648.
45. See text accompanying notes 57-60 infra.
46. Price enhancement cases seem to be divided into two categories. The
first is comprised of disputes between parties who have entered into anticom-
petitive agreements. While the common law attitude toward these agreements
was not entirely clear, see generally Peppin, Price-Fixing Agreements Under the
Sherman Anti-Trust Law, 28 CAIxF. L. RE V. 297 (1940), such agreements were
frequently held unenforceable. See, e.g., Santa Clara Valley Mill & Lumber Co.
v. Hayes, 76 Cal. 387, 18 P. 391 (1888); Craft v. McConoughy, 79 Il. 346 (1875);
Gibbs v. Smith, 115 Mass. 592 (1874); Arnot v. Pittston & Elmira Coal Co., 68
N.Y. 558 (1877); Central Ohio Salt Co. v. Guthrie, 35 Ohio St. 666 (1880); Morris
Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co., 68 Pa. 173 (1871). The second category in-
cludes cases resembling private antitrust actions in which one party to the
agreement has filed suit for money had and received in connection with an
overcharge. In these cases, however, the issue was whether the parties' entry
into the price-enhancing contract was voluntary, rather than whether the price-
enhancing activity itself was legal. See, e.g., Radich v. Hutchins, 95 U.S. 210
(1877); Dennehy v. McNulta, 86 F 825 (7th Cir. 1898); Emery v. City of Lowell,
127 Mass. 138 (1879); Custin v. City of Viroqua, 67 Wis. 314, 30 N.W. 515 (1886).
47. 203 U.S. 390 (1906).
48. See L. SuLLrvAN, supra note 22, § 252, at 788. See also Hanover Shoe,
Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 489-90, 490 & n.8 (1968).
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between the price paid and the market or fair price."49 Thus,
even though ascertainment of market price is not free from dif-
ficulty,5 0 victims of price-fixing agreements found the proof of
damages problem far less threatening after Chattanooga Foun-
dry since they did not have to prove lost profits.
Because of the peculiar facts in Chattanooga Foundry,
however, it is obvious that the Court's acceptance of the over-
charge measure was based on necessity, and the case can
hardly be interpreted as proscribing the use of a lost profits
measure in all price enhancement cases. The plaintiff in Chat-
tanooga Foundry was a municipal public utility engaged in
selling and distributing water to the residents of Atlanta.5 ' Be-
cause certain iron pipe producers had formed a cartel, the city
of Atlanta could purchase pipes for its waterworks only at in-
flated prices. 52 The municipality passed on the entire amount
of this overcharge to its customers by incorporating it into the
rate base upon which water charges were computed. 3 Since
the municipality had not purchased the pipe for resale and was
acting as a public utility, it could not use the pipe in any ven-
ture for profit.54 Obviously, a damage theory based on lost prof-
its would have been inappropriate. Furthermore, the alleged
overcharge was in fact an accurate measure of compensatory
damages since it was equal to the amount by which the cus-
tomers of the utility were injured in their '"property."5 5
It is therefore an overgeneralization to say that Chattanoo-
ga Foundry established the overcharge as the only correct
measure of damages in price enhancement cases. Unlike Chat-
tanooga Foundry, many price enhancement cases involve
plaintiffs whose sole purpose in purchasing the illegally priced
good is to process and resell it at a profit. In such cases, the
theoretically correct measure of compensatory damages is lost
profits since this measure is based on the actual injury sus-
tained by the plaintiff. When the plaintiff is in business for
profit, the overcharge measure is not truly compensatory;
49. 203 U.S. at 396.
50. See C. BANE, THE ELEcTIcAL EQun'MEar CONSPIRACIES 47-62 (1973);
Guilfofil, supra note 1, at 652.
51. See City of Atlanta v. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipeworks, 127 F. 23, 25
(6th Cir. 1903), af'd, 203 U.S. 390 (1906).
52. 203 U.S. at 395-96.
53. See L. SuLizvAN, supra note 22, § 252, at 788.
54. See 127 F. at 25.
55. See note 10 supra. Of course, one could argue that the consumers in
Chattanooga Foundry were damaged by an amount in excess of the over-
charge because of the "diminished volume" effect. See pp. 770-72 infra.
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rather, it represents the amount by which the defendant was
unjustly enriched.
One might expect that in the pre-Eastman Kodak era56 the
quantum of damages issue would have been a serious barrier
to recovery in all but Chattanooga Foundry-type, pure price-
fixing cases. This did not prove to be so. Plaintiffs avoided the
problem by defining damages, when possible, in terms of price
differentials rather than lost profits. Such an approach was
taken in Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co.,5 7 a case involv-
ing a refusal to deal. Two aspects of Straus are particularly
noteworthy. First, in order to avoid the risk of nonrecovery, the
plaintiff sued for the price differential rather than lost profits.5 8
The court recognized the proof of damages problem and
deemed the overcharge measure a permissible method of
avoiding it.59 Second, the court was aware of the imprecision of
the price differential measure but viewed it as resulting from
the necessity of finding "some way in which damages can be
awarded where a wrong has been done."60 It should be noted
that in Straus a legal or reasonable purchase price was easily
ascertainable, since it was the price currently paid by favored
customers.6 1
A variation of the price differential versus lost profits
theme appears in cases in which conspirators, attempting to
drive a competitor from the market, fix prices below those that
would have existed in the absence of the conspiracy. In Story
Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co.,62 the plaintiff,
at the court of appeals level, relied primarily on Straus to sup-
port the proposition that it need not show lost profits to recover
damages.63 As in Straus, the plaintiffs objective was to avoid
the risk of nonrecovery that would arise if it were forced to
prove lost profits. The damages issue in Story Parchment was,
56. Eastman Kodak is discussed in text accompanying notes 35-42 supra.
57. 297 F. 791 (2d Cir. 1924). In Straus the plaintiff refused to participate in
the defendant's newly instituted distribution system and therefore was not per-
mitted to purchase merchandise at a price reflecting the usual dealer's dis-
count. The plaintiff continued to deal in the defendant's merchandise, but was
forced to obtain it at retail prices. Id. at 795. The court calculated damages as
the difference between retail price and the price that would have been charged
if the dealer had cooperated. See id. at 800-04.
58. Id. at 802-03.
59. Id. at 803.
60. Id. at 802.
61. See id. at 803.
62. 37 F.2d 537 (1st Cir. 1930), rev'd, 282 U.S. 555 (1931). Commentaries on
Story Parchment can be found in Clark, supra note 15, at 372-77; Donovan & Ir-
vine, supra note 15, at 515-16.
63. 37 F.2d at 539-40.
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as the court pointed out, quite different from that in Straus; in
Straus the price at which merchandise could have been
purchased by the plaintiff in the absence of the refusal to deal
was ascertainable by reference to the price paid by favored cus-
tomers. In Story Parchment, however, the price at which the
plaintiff's merchandise could have been sold in the absence of
the pricing conspiracy was dictated by competitive forces. The
court reasoned that the actual price would depend on how ag-
gressively the defendants would have competed in the absence
of the conspiracy, and that it possibly would have been no
higher than the conspiratorially determined price. 64 Thus,
while the court deemed price differential the appropriate meas-
ure of recovery in some cases, it regarded its use here as too
speculative.65
The Supreme Court reversed,66 upholding the district
court's submission of the damage issue to the jury. The Court
indicated that there was sufficient evidence to allow a determi-
nation of what the nonconspiratorial price of the good would
have been.67 Of particular interest is the Court's reliance on
Eastman Kodak-a lost profits case.68 Not only was the plain-
tiff in Story Parchment permitted to use the generally easier-to-
prove price differential measure of damages, but it was further
benefited by the Court's Eastman Kodak-like reasoning that
while "damages may not be determined by mere speculation or
guess, it will be enough if the evidence show the extent of the
damages as a matter of just and reasonable inference."6 9 It
seems reasonable to have expected the Court to reach the op-
posite result. If, as is clearly implied by Straus and Story
Parchment, the price differential measure of overcharge was
created to avoid the difficult problem of proving lost profits,
Eastman Kodak alone would seem to have made any addi-
tional accommodation unnecessary.
The most serious challenge to the gross overcharge meas-
ure of damages came in the 1968 case of Hanover Shoe, Inc. v.
United Shoe Machinery Corp.7O in which the illegal overcharge
resulted from United Shoe's policy of leasing machinery rather
64. Id. at 540-41.
65. Id. at 541.
66. 282 U.S. 556, 568 (1931).
67. Id. at 562.
68. Id. at 653. Eastman Kodak is discussed in text accompanying notes 35-
42 supra.
69. 282 U.S. at 563.
70. 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
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than making it available for purchase.71 The damages issue
was whether the defendant should be held liable for the full
amount of the overcharge even though the plaintiff had passed
on a portion of the overcharge to its own customers.7 2 In short,
were the charges passed through to remote purchasers dam-
ages sustained by the plaintiff under section 4 of the Clayton
Act?73
The Court rejected the pass-on defense and, in the interest
of disgorging the illegally obtained revenues, held the defend-
ant liable for the full amount of the overcharge. 74 Although
Hanover Shoe has been the subject of thorough analysis else-
where,7 5 two important aspects of the decision warrant addi-
tional attention. First, the overriding thrust of the Court's
holding is one of practicality.76 The Court felt that allowing the
pass-on defense would open the door to "long and complicated
proceedings involving massive evidence and complicated theo-
ries. '77 Second, it is not clear that in rejecting the pass-on de-
fense the Court necessarily rejected a pure "lost profits" theory
of recovery.
There is in fact considerable support for the position that
the Court, despite its desire to disgorge the fruits of the illegal
activity, recognized lost profits as the theoretically correct
measure of damages. For example, the Court conceded that a
pass-on defense may be appropriate in cases in which the "vic-
tim" was selling on the basis of a preexisting cost-plus con-
tract 78 and noted that it may be necessary to require proof of
lost profits in cases in which the plaintiff is unable to prove a
difference between an unlawful price and a price required by
law.7 9 Similarly, the Court in Hanover Shoe seems implicitly to
have acknowledged that the use of the overcharge measure of
71. Plaintiff in Hanover Shoe successfully argued that the findings, opin-
ion, and decree in an earlier civil case brought by the government against
United Shoe, see United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 100 F. Supp. 295 (D.
Mass. 1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954), constituted prima facie evidence of
United Shoe's illegal, monopolizing practices. See 392 U.S. at 484-87.
72. 392 U.S. at 487-88.
73. See id. at 487-89 (quoting Clayton Act, § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976)). Sec-
tion 4 of the Clayton Act appears in note 11 supra.
74. 392 U.S. at 494.
75. See, e.g., L. Su.ivAN, supra note 22, § 252, at 789-91; Schaefer, supra
note 5; Watson, supra note 6; Weinberg, supra note 20, at 500-06.
76. See L. SuttvAN, supra note 22, § 252, at 790.
77. 392 U.S. at 493.
78. Id. at 494.
79. Id.
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damages is merely an accommodation to the difficulties of prov-
ing lost profits:
If in the face of the overcharge the buyer does nothing and absorbs
the loss, he is entitled to treble damages. This much seems conceded.
The reason is that he has paid more than he should and his property
has been illegally diminished, for had the price paid been lower his
profits would have been higher.... As long as the seller continues to
charge the illegal price, he takes from the buyer more than the law al-
lows. At whatever price the buyer sells, the price he pays the seller re-
mains illegally high, and his profits would be greater were his costs
lower.8 0
From this, it is reasonable to infer that the underlying concern
of the Court was the impact of the overcharge on profits. The
Court may not have been convinced that a simplistic compari-
son of profits-for example, those occurring before and after a
conspiracysl-would detect actual losses because of the failure
of this method to account for the influence of the many other
variables affecting profits during these periods. Finally, the
Court's concern with the difficulty of determining both the
costs of production and the impact of price on volume indicates
that it regarded the lost profits determination as technically im-
practical, but not necessarily theoretically inappropriate.82
This is to say nothing more than that the Court's reasoning
in Hanover Shoe does not seem to foreclose the use of lost prof-
its as an appropriate measure of damages in price enhance-
ment cases. On the other hand, it should be noted that the
legal precedents 83 and policy arguments 84 relied on by the
Court in rejecting the pass-on defense do not support even the
theoretical appropriateness of the lost profits measure. In addi-
tion, the Court hinted that it was actually rejecting the very no-
80. Id. at 489 (emphasis added).
81. For a discussion of the "before and after" method, see text accompany-
ing notes 132=140 infra.
82. See 392 U.S. at 492-93.
83. The Court in Hanover Shoe relied primarily on Chattanooga Foundry &
Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906), see text accompanying notes
47-55 supra, and South Pac. Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 531
(1918), for support in disallowing the pass-on defense. See 392 U.S. at 489, 490 &
n.8. In Darnell-Taenzer, the plaintiff-shipper sought to recover the amount of
an overcharge associated with a rate found to be excessive by the Interstate
Commerce Commission. 245 U.S. at 533. The issue was whether the defendants
could use the pass-on defense. The Court, speaking through Justice Holmes,
did not permit the defense, reasoning that "[tihe general tendency of the law,
in regard to damages at least, is not to go beyond the first step." Id. See also
Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 489-90, 490 & n.8
(1968).
84. The Court reasoned that permitting the pass-on defense would reduce
the deterrent effect of treble-damage actions since it would diffuse and thereby
reduce the incentive to bring private suits. 392 U.S. at 494.
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tion that damages should be apportioned among various layers
of buyers and sellers.85 This interpretation is bolstered by the
Court's subsequent opinion in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois8( in
which the Court discussed at length the difficulties of allocating
an overcharge fund among direct and indirect purchasers.8 7 As
will be shown in the following section, apportioning the over-
charge is quite different from awarding lost profits. Yet, to the
extent that the apportionment process has been rejected by the
Court, it would be inappropriate to infer that the lost profits
measure has received even implicit approval.
While the Supreme Court's view of the theory of lost prof-
its as a remedy in price enhancement cases is less than clear,
there is no doubt that the illegal overcharge measure is highly
imprecise. Moreover, the development of advanced statistical
techniques88 and the relaxation of the standard for proving the
quantum of lost profits renders far less compelling the practical
considerations that courts have relied on to support their
choice of the overcharge measure. It is to these matters that
the following material is directed.
I. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PRICE-FIXING REMEDIES
A. THE GROSS OVERCHARGE AND PASS-ON ADJUSTED
OVERCHARGE REMEDIES
The microeconomic model most frequently used 89 to illus-
trate the gross overcharge phenomenon is one that treats the
increase in cost resulting from anticompetitive activity as an
excise tax.90 This model can be used to determine not only the
total amount of the overcharge, but also the portion of the over-
charge that has been passed on by the direct purchaser to indi-
rect purchasers.9 ' The model can also be used to predict the
impact of a price change on the level of the direct purchaser's
85. Id.
86. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
87. Id. at 740-41, 745. This aspect of the Illinois Brick decision is discussed
at text accompanying notes 125-127 infra.
88. Multivariate regression analysis is one such technique. See text ac-
companying notes 152-169 infra.
89. See R. POSNER, ANTrrRUST 147-49 (1974); Cirace, supra note 5, at 179, 180
& n.53, 181 & n.53, 182 & n.55, 183; Schaefer, supra note 5, at 887-97.
90. An excise tax is a tax paid by a commodity seller and is administered
on a per unit or value of the commodity basis. B. DAviE & B. DUNCOMBE, PUB-
uC FINANCE 121 (1972).
91. For a discussion of the basic excise tax models from which this analy-
sis of price enhancement is drawn, see id. at 122-26; C. FERGUSON & S. MAURICE,
EcoNoMc ANALYSIS: THEORY AND APPLCATION 68-70, 372-73 (3d ed. 1978).
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output, and can be adapted to situations in which the good is
sold in either a perfectly or imperfectly competitive market.
1. Perfectly Competitive Market
Figure I illustrates the case in which a good, after being
purchased from the manufacturer, is resold in a perfectly com-
petitive market. The firms that buy and resell the good are re-
ferred to as intermediate firms. The good is an intermediate
good when passed from the manufacturer to the intermediate
firms and a final good when sold by the intermediate firms. Ig-
noring D 2 for the moment, equilibrium quantity and price for
the final good are determined by the intersection of D1 and S 1,
the- demand and supply curves. The impact of an increase in
cost to the intermediate firms brought on by an increase in
price charged by the manufacturer for the intermediate good is
represented by a vertical shift of the supply curve equal to the
amount of the price increase. 92
Price
S2
P3 ---- . -Q
P21 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -------- p E
B---------------------- G
I
__________________1 1 LQuantity
Q 2 Q 3 Qi
Figure I
92. In the short run, the supply curve in a perfectly competitive market is
equal to the horizontal summation of the marginal cost curves of all the firms
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In Figure I, S2 is the supply curve after the price of the in-
termediate good has been increased by an amount equal to the
difference between P2 and A measured along the vertical axis.
The impact of this change on the price and quantity of the final
good is illustrated by their movement to a new equilibrium po-
sition: E*. Equilibrium price has increased from P1 to P2.
Thus, while cost to the intermediate firms has increased by the
amount P2 minus A, they have passed on a portion of this in-
crease in the form of a higher price for the final good.93 Despite
this partial pass on, the intermediate purchasers as plaintiffs
would be entitled to damages equal to the increase in price
times the quantity purchased after the price increase. In Fig-
ure I, this would equal area AP2E*C. The amount of the "dam-
ages" that have been passed on to indirect purchasers would
equal PlP2E*F94 and the overcharge actually absorbed by the
intermediate firms would equal AP1 FC.95
Figure I also illustrates that the portion of the gross over-
charge which is passed on varies according to the elasticity96 of
in the industry. Marginal cost is the change in total cost associated with the
production of one additional unit. Thus, regardless of the level of output, an ex-
cise tax raises marginal cost by the amount of the tax.
93. A simple mathematical example illustrates this phenomenon. Assume
that the demand curve is P = 20 - .5Q, and that supply curve S1 is P = 5 + .5Q.
Solving the equations simultaneously, the equilibrium price is $12.50, and the
quantity produced is 15 units. If cost to the intermediate firm is increased by
$1.00 per unit, the new supply curve, S2 , is P = 6 + .5Q. The new equilibrium
price is $13.00, and quantity has dropped to 14 units. Thus, only half of the cost
increase to the intermediate firm, $.50 per unit, has been passed on in the form
of a higher price for the final good, the remainder has been absorbed by the
intermediate firm.
94. This area equals the price increase multiplied by the quantity sold af-
ter the impact of the price enhancement has been felt.
95. This is the difference between areas AP2E*C and PIP2E*F. The por-
tion of the total price increase passed on to consumers is equal to (P 2 - PI)/(P2 - A)-
96. Elasticity can be defined as the percentage change in any dependent
variable divided by the corresponding percentage change in the relevant in-
dependent variable. The resulting ratio indicates the responsiveness of the de-
pendent variable to changes in the independent variable. See E. BRIGHAM & J.
PAPPAS, MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS 103-06 (2d ed. 1976). In other words, elasticity
of demand equals the percentage change in quantity demanded divided by the
percentage change in price. Elasticity of supply equals the percentage change
in quantity supplied divided by the percentage change in price. For a descrip-
tion of the details of these calculations, see C. FERGUSON & S. MAURICE, supra
note 91, at 20-30. Technically, one cannot ascertain the elasticity of most de-
mand or supply curves by mere inspection. The slopes of the curves can be
used, however, as indicators of their relative elasticities. In Figure I, the slope
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the supply and demand curves. If demand were D2 instead of
D 1, the increase in cost of the intermediate good-although the
same as in case D 1-- would have caused the price of the final
good to increase to P 3 instead of P 2 . Thus, with the more in-
elastic demand curve, the cost increase is passed on to a
greater degree.
This second example reveals another problem with the re-
medial scheme. The intermediate firms facing demand D 2 will
experience a greater gross overcharge and therefore recover
more than their D1 counterparts. 97 The total overcharge-the
price increase to the intermediate firms multiplied by the quan-
tity purchased-will be equal to BP 3E**G. Although the price
increase to the intermediate firms is the same as in the D1
case,98 volume has not declined as much because D 2 is more in-
elastic.9 9 In the D 2 case, the amount of the price increase
passed on is equal to P 1P 3E**H, while the overcharge absorbed
by the intermediate firms is BP1 HG. A comparison of the two
cases indicates that a greater portion of the overcharge is
passed on in the case of the intermediate firms facing demand
D 2.100 In short, if those purchasing from the intermediate firms
have relatively inelastic demand functions, the intermediate
firms as plaintiffs can not only prove greater damages, but can
of D 2 is steeper than D1, indicating that purchasers are less responsive to
changes in price in case D2 than they are in case D 1.
97. Because the price increase exacted by the manufacturer is the same in
the D2 case as in the D1 case, it may at first seem anomalous that the D 2 over-
charge, which measures the amount by which the manufacturer has been un-
justly enriched, is different from the D1 overcharge. These results are
consistent, however, since the overcharge is a function not only of the price dif-
ferential, but also of the volume purchased at the enhanced price. In this
model, the volume of the intermediate good purchased at the enhanced price
will vary according to the elasticity of demand for the final good facing the in-
termediate purchaser. See note 99 infra. Thus, a price increase by a manufac-
turer could result in a variety of degrees of unjust enrichment depending on
the elasticities of demand facing the intermediate firm.
98. The price enhancement in the 1)2 case- P 3 minus B-is identical to
that in the D1 case-P 2 minus A-because both result in the same vertical shift
of S1 to a new, parallel supply function, S2 .
99. In D 1, volume declined by the quantity (Q 1 - Q 2 ), while in D2 , volume
declined only by the quantity (Q 1 - Q3).
100. Although this result is not necessarily clear from Figure I, it can be
demonstrated by assigning values to the various points on the vertical and hori-
zontal axes. Assume the following values: P 3 = $100, P 2 = $80, P1 = $60, B =
$50, A = $30, Q3 = 30 units, Q 2 = 20 units, and Q1 = 40 units. Then
Gross Overcharge:
D 1 = 20 ($ 80 - $30) = $1000
D 2 = 30 ($100 - $50) = $1500
Pass On.
D, = 20 ($ 80 - $60) = $ 400
D 2 = 30 ($100 - $60) = $1200
[Vol. 64.751
LOST PROFITS
pass on a higher percentage of these damages to their custom-
ers.
2. Imperfectly Competitive Market
The excise tax model can also be used to illustrate the im-
pact of a cost increase on a firm reselling in an imperfectly
competitive market.'0 ' Although the outcome is much the
same as in a perfectly competitive market, this model is in-
cluded because of its more realistic assumptions concerning
market conditions and because it introduces the cost curves
that are necessary for determining the actual damage sustained
by the intermediate firm. In Figure II, MC, is the marginal cost
curve of the intermediate firm prior to the anticompetitive ac-
tivity at the manufacturing level and MR is the intermediate
firm's marginal revenue curve. 02 The profit-maximizing level
of output occurs at the intersection of MC. and MR. The profit-
maximizing price is the price that corresponds to this level of
output on the demand curve. Thus, profit is maximized at price
P, and quantity Q1.
The increase in price due to anticompetitive behavior at
the manufacturing level is reflected as a vertical shift in the in-
termediate firm's marginal cost curve103 corresponding to the
amount of the price increase of the intermediate good. In Fig-
ure 11, MC2 is the marginal cost curve of the intermediate firm
after an anticompetitive price increase at the manufacturing
level. The new profit-maximizing level of output is Q2, and the
profit-maximizing price has increased to P 2. Thus the increase
in price to the intermediate firm has been partially passed on
through an increase in price of the final good.
Based on this model, the gross overcharge is equal to the
increase in cost--C2 minus C,-multiplied by the new volume
Proportion of Gross Overcharge Passed On:
D, = 400/1000 = 40%
D2 = 1200/1500 = 80%
101. See B. DAViE & B. Du NcomBE, supra note 90, at 124-25.
102. Marginal revenue (MR) is the increase in total revenue derived from
the sale of one additional unit of output. Marginal cost (MC) is the increase in
total cost resulting from the production of one additional unit of output. A
profit-maximizing firm will expand production so long as MR is greater than
MC, stopping only when MR equals MC. For an explanation of the basic
microeconomic theory involved in determining the profit-maximizing output
and price, see C. FERGUSON & S. MAUMCE, supra note 91, at 338-42.
103. This analysis applies if the cost increase is for a good that is processed
and resold to consumers. If the increase is in the cost of a capital good, how-
ever, the curve will not shift as indicated, but the general conclusions flowing
from this analysis remain the same.
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Figure H
of the final good; it is represented by area C1 C2DE. The
amount passed on is equal to the price increase of the final
good-P 2 minus Pl-multiplied by the new volume; it is repre-
sented by area P 1P 2 FG. As in the perfectly competitive model,
the proportion of the pass on will vary according to elasticity of
demand and the responsiveness of marginal cost to changes in
volume.
B. THE VOLUME ADJUSTED OVERCHARGE REMEDY
The preceding discussion points out the imprecision of the
currently used method of calculating damages in price en-
hancement cases. Much of this imprecision is due to the pass-
on phenomenon. An additional and perhaps equally important
problem, at least in terms of supporting the lost profits meas-
ure, is that the gross overcharge measure ignores the impact
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that the enhanced price has had on the volume of the final good
eventually produced.
Figure III, which illustrates this problem, shows the de-
mand of an intermediate firm or firms for an intermediate good.
Where P1 is the competitive price and P 2 the illegally enhanced
price, the price enhancement has caused the intermediate
firm's volume to drop from Q, to Q2. The gross overcharge, if
calculated according to the currently used method, would be
equal to area P 1P 2AB. The problem with this measure of dam-
ages, however, is that it does not reflect the losses associated
with the diminution in volume caused by the anticompetitive
behavior. An alternative solution, multiplying the price differ-
ential by the volume originally demanded, would result in a
gross overcharge equal to area P 1P 2CF. This method is also un-
satisfactory because it significantly overstates the actual
amount of the manufacturer's unjust enrichment.
A
D
Q2 Q3 Qi
Figure In
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Solving the diminished volume problem requires that the
lost surplus of the intermediate firm be taken into account. An
intermediate firm will continue to purchase goods from a man-
ufacturer so long as, after the good is processed at the interme-
diate level, its sale will contribute a surplus toward fixed costs
and profit.10 4 Thus, at the illegally enhanced price of P 2, the in-
termediate firm will purchase Q2 units from the manufacturer,
since each of the units contributes to the producer's surplus.
The enhanced price has simply eliminated that portion of the
producer's surplus-represented by area PP 2AB-that would
have existed had the units been purchased at the competitive
price of P 1. It is not true, however, that area BACF represents
the sum of the differences between the competitive price, P1,
and the highest price at which the intermediate firm would be
willing to purchase each unit.10 5 For example, the intermediate
firm would become indifferent to buying unit Q3 at any price
greater than P 3. If Q 3 were purchased at the competitive price
of P1, its contribution to producer's surplus would be equal to
P 3 minus P1 . Thus, the diminution of volume brought on by the
illegal price enhancement would result in an additional loss of
producer surplus equal to triangle ABF.
In short, the overcharge area PIP 2 AB is the lost surplus on
the units still purchased. Area ABF is the surplus associated
with the units that are no longer purchased. One could argue
that consistency requires a recovery equal to both losses-area
PP 2AF. This would not, however, solve the pass-on problem
discussed earlier.106 The measure that eliminates both the
pass-on and diminished volume problems is lost profits.l07
C. THE LOST PIoFITs REMEDY
The lost profits model is based on the economics of transfer
pricing'0 8 and vertical integration.10 9 It includes elements from
104. This surplus is called "producer's surplus". See A. MARSHALTL, PRINCI-
PLES OF EcoNow.cs 810-11 n.2, 830-32 (8th ed. 1920). The term "surplus" or "Pro-
ducer's surplus" is used frequently throughout the remainder of this Article.
Since this surplus is a contribution to both fixed cost and profit, any change in
this surplus will manifest itself as some change in profit.
105. The highest price a firm is willing to pay for a particular unit is repre-
sented by the demand curve for the intermediate good. See text accompanying
note 112 infra.
106. The overcharge and lost surplus measures are analogous, since both
represent contributions to fixed costs and profit which the intermediate firm no
longer earns.
107. See text accompanying notes 116-118 supra.
108. Transfer pricing refers to the method for setting a price on a good that
is transferred between divisions of a firm that are treated as profit centers. See
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all three levels of the production chain that stretches from
manufacturer to intermediate producer to ultimate consumer.
In Figure IV, Df is the demand of consumers for the final
good.n 0 It is the demand facing the intermediate producer.
From D1, the marginal revenue resulting from the sale of the
final good, MiR., can be derived. This marginal revenue function
can in turn be used to derive the demand of the intermediate
firm for the intermediate good.1 Since the demand curve
shows the highest price that individuals are willing to pay for a
good at a variety of output levels," 2 the intermediate firm's de-
mand for units of the intermediate good can be derived by sub-
tracting the firm's marginal cost of processing the unit from the
marginal revenue generated by its sale in final form. For exam-
ple, if the marginal cost of processing a unit at the intermediate
level is eight dollars, and the marginal revenue generated by its
sale as a final good is ten dollars, the intermediate firm would
be willing to pay up to to two dollars for the unit. At any price
lower than two dollars, the processing and resale of the good
would generate a surplus that will contribute to fixed costs and
profit. In other words, the intermediate firm will continue to
purchase goods from the manufacturer so long as when the
cost of processing a good at the intermediate level (MCf) is
subtracted from the marginal revenue generated by the sale of
the final good (MRf), there still remains enough to pay the
price of the intermediate good."13
E. BRiGHAm & J. PAPPAs, supra note 96, at 364-74; Hirshleifer, On The Economics
of Transfer Pricing, 1956 J. Bus., July, at 172.
109. See E. SINGER, ANTrrRUST ECONOMICS 206-211 (1968).
110. Df slopes downward, indicating that the final good is sold in an imper-
fectly competitive market. If the final good were sold in a perfectly competitive
market, Df would be a horizontal line. Assumptions about the nature of the
market for the final good do not, however, alter this analysis.
111. The intermediate good could be anything from a raw material to a
finished good sold to a retailer. If it is a capital good, the analysis will vary
from the one presented here, but the conclusions should be the same.
112. This definition of demand is simply the converse of the traditional
"quantity perspective" definition. See C. McCONNELL, ECONOMICS 59-60 (6th ed.
1975).
113. If the price of an intermediate good (PI) equals MIU minus MCf, the
firm will be indifferent to the purchase of that particular unit. This result sim-
ply expresses the profit-maximizing condition that MR equals MC, because the
last possible unit produced will be when PI = MRA - MCf. Adding MCf to both
sides of this equation results in: PI + MCf = MR. Since the total marginal cost
(MC) of the firm is actually the sum of the marginal cost of the processing un-
dertaken by the intermediate firm (MCf) plus the cost of obtaining the interme-
diate good (PI), MC = PI + MCf and MC- = MRfl.
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MR, MP - MC, D
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Figure IV
In Figure IV, the manufacturer is faced with an in-
termediate firm's demand curve, labelled f minus MCf. The
line MCI, AVC, represents the marginal and average variable
costs of the manufacturer. They are assumed to be equal in or-
der to simplify the presentation. In a competitive market, the
manufacturers would sell Q1 units to the intermediate firm at a
price of PI(1 ).114 The final good would be sold at Pf(1), and this
would result in a producer's surplus represented by the trian-
gle PI(1)GE.115 If, however, there is monopolistic pricing at the
manufacturing level, the number of units purchased by the in-
114. In this case the marginal cost curve is the supply curve of the manufac-
turer. In order to simplify the presentation, the intermediate firm is assumed
to be a monopolist that does not possess monopsony power in purchasing inter-
mediate goods.
115. For any unit Q, the Amf - MCf curve indicates the amount remaining
after the marginal cost generated by the intermediate firm has been subtracted
from the marginal revenue associated with the sale of the unit as a final good.
Subtracting the cost of the intermediate good from this amount leaves the sur-
plus which that unit contributes to fixed cost and overhead. The area PI(1 )GE
is therefore the sum of the producer's surpluses associated with the sale of Q1
units.
[Vol. 64.751
LOST PROFITS
termediate firm will no longer be determined by the intersec-
tion of demand-MRl minus MCf -with line MCI, AVCI.
Rather, the quantity will drop to Q2 where the manufacturer's
marginal revenue curve, MR,, intersects line MCI, AVC. The
profit-maximizing price charged by the manufacturer for its in-
termediate good will therefore rise to PI(2).
Based on the gross overcharge measure, damages would
equal the area PI(1)PI(2 )AB. Part of this overcharge, of course,
would be passed on to consumers in the form of a price in-
crease of the final good from Pf(1) to Pf(2). The amount of the
pass-on would equal area Pf(I)Pf(2)CF, and the actual over-
charge absorbed by the intermediate firm would equal
P I (1)PI( 2)AB minus Pf(1)Pf(2)CF. This pass-on adjustment,
however, does not consider the impact of the overcharge on the
intermediate firm's volume. The reduction of volume from Q,
to Q2 will eliminate the producer's surplus that was associated
with those units that are no longer produced. This loss of sur-
plus is equal to area BAE.116
A true measure of damages should not include that portion
of the overcharge that is passed on to subsequent purchasers,
but should include the lost surplus associated with the in-
termediate firm's diminished volume. This is in fact the meas-
ure of damages that results when one focuses on the producer's
surplus remaining after the price increase. The total surplus
before the monopolistic pricing was area PI(I)GE, but after-
ward the surplus had been reduced to area PI(2 )GA. The differ-
ence between areas PI(1)GE and PI(2 )GA is therefore the actual
damage resulting from the illegal price increase.
While Figure IV is useful in isolating the different effects of
the price increase as well as in illustrating the relationship be-
tween the manufacturer and intermediate purchaser, the actual
lost surplus, or profit contribution," 7 can more easily be identi-
fied using the basic microeconomic model for a firm operating
in an imperfectly competitive market." 8 In Figure V, line MC1,
AVC, represents the marginal and average variable costs prior
116. See generally text accompanying notes 104-105 supra.
117. Profit contribution is the difference between price and average variable
cost on a per unit basis. E. BRiGHAm & J. PAPPAs, supra note 96, at 268. Since
Figure V includes average variable cost, it is convenient to shift from the lost
surplus to the profit contribution concept for the following analysis. In Figure
V the profit contribution is equal to the sun of the differences between the
marginal revenue and marginal cost of each unit that is sold. Since these dif-
ferences will be the contribution of the units to fixed costs and profit, the sum
of these differences is equal to the total profit contribution.
118. See, e.g., C. FERGUSON & S. MAURICE, .supra note 91, at 338-42.
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to the illegal activity. The profit-maximizing quantity-where
MR equals MC-is Qj; the profit-maximizing price is P1. Total
revenue is equal to price times quantity, represented by area
OP1AQ1. Total variable cost is equal to AVC1 at Q1 multiplied
by Q1, or area OC1BQ1. The difference between total revenue
and total variable cost is the profit contribution and is equal to
area C1P1AB.
Price
P2---- E
P,
-
- A
CIFC2 MC2, AVC2
C, MCI, AVC,
MR D
0- Quantity
Q2  Q,
Figure V
A price increase would shift the marginal and average vari-
able costs curve to a higher level represented by line MC2,
AVC2. The new profit-maximizing level of output would be Q2,
and the new price P2. The intermediate firm's total revenue is
now area OP2EQ2, and its total variable costs equal area
OC 2FQ2. Area C2P 2EF is therefore the new level of profit con-
tribution. The difference between area C1P 1AB-the level of
profit contribution before the illegal price enhancement-and
C2P2EF-the new level of profit contribution-would be the lost
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profit sustained by the intermediate firm and, therefore, its ac-
tual loss.
D. SUMMARY: THE APPROPRIATENESS OF THE LOST PROFITS
REMEDY AFTER ILLINOIS BRICK
Nine years after rejecting the pass-on defense, n9 the
Supreme Court, in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinoi,' 20 rejected the
notion that the pass-on theory can be used offensively by indi-
rect purchasers to prove that they have been injured by the an-
ticompetitive activity of a remote producer.121 The Illinois
Brick decision seems absolutely to foreclose the possibility of
indirect-purchaser standing in price enhancement suits. 122 It
should be noted, however, that Illinois Brick dealt with a claim
for a portion of an overcharge fund, not a claim for lost profits.
As the preceding analysis has illustrated, there is a vast differ-
ence between an accurate lost profits measure and the pass-on
adjusted overcharge measure. Lost profits is a compensatory
measure and is determined by the individual plaintiff's demand
and cost functions. The pass-on adjustment, on the other hand,
is designed to impart some compensatory aspect to a theory of
damages--disgorging unjust enrichment-that is largely unre-
lated to that end.
The Court in Illinois Brick was aware of the tension be-
tween the goals of disgorgement and compensation,123 and
chose to subordinate compensation, in its pass-on adjustment
form, to disgorgement. The reasons given by the Court, how-
ever, do not in strict logic require the conclusion that indirect
purchasers can never be compensated.124 The Court was reluc-
tant to allow indirect-purchaser standing without overruling
Hanover Shoe because of the risk of multiple liability for a sin-
119. See Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 488
(1968), discussed in text accompanying notes 70-87 supra.
120. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
121. Id. at 735.
122. This appears to be the view of the majority in Illinois Brick. See id. at
746.
123. See id. The Court conceded that allowing offensive pass-on recoveries
might be a step toward more compensatory awards, but expressed doubts that
the amount of a pass-on recovery "would reflect the actual injury suffered." Id.
at 746-47.
124. In addition to the compulsory joinder and diminished deterrence
problems cited by the Court, see id. at 737-38, 745, the majority in Illinois Brick
felt that the reasoning of the Court in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968), militated against the offensive pass-on theory as well.
See 431 U.S. at 746.
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gle violation.125 The Court found the alternative of overruling
Hanover Shoe and allowing offensive use of the pass on equally
unattractive because it would (1) require compulsory joinder of
every potential plaintiff at each level of the distribution chain 126
and (2) diminish the deterrent effect of the threat of private en-
;forcement by spreading the overcharge fund among many
plaintiffs instead of awarding it to one.127
The striking aspect of the lost profits remedy is that its use
would eliminate the risk of multiple liability 28 and would per-
mit the overruling of Hanover Shoe without creating the
problems the Court was trying to avoid in that case. The differ-
ence is due to the fact that the lost profits measure is not pre-
mised on the assumption that an indirect purchaser's damages
are a fraction of a common fund. Thus, the compulsory joinder
problem disappears; no other potential plaintiffs could reason-
ably claim an interest in the lost profits of the plaintiff bringing
suit. Similarly, the lost profits measure is unlikely to diminish
the effectiveness of private enforcement. First, the number of
potential individual or class plaintiffs would increase substan-
tially. Second, the aggregate of the potential lost profits claims
would be difficult for the violating firm or firms to anticipate
and it could exceed the amount of the illegal overcharge.129
It appears therefore that the Supreme Court's rejection of
indirect purchaser standing is due in large part to the adher-
ence of courts to the overcharge measure of damages. If lost
125. 431 U.S. at 730. The Court was not concerned so much that more than
one party would recover damages as it was that the defendant might be forced
to make duplicative payments of an amount that, as a matter of law, was the
full measure of the damages it had inflicted by its anticompetitive activity.
126. Id. at 737-38.
127. Id. at 745.
128. The plaintiff who recovers the total amount of an overcharge fund has
received a windfall by recovering certain damages sustained not by him, but by
other potential plaintiffs. The essence of the multiple liability problem in the
overcharge context is that the defendant may have to pay damages to one
plaintiff when he has already paid those damages once before as a windfall to
another plaintiff. Under the lost profits scheme of damages, each recovery
against a defendant would reflect only those damages the defendant's anticom-
petitive activity had caused the recovering plaintiff. Since no plaintiff would
reap windfall damages, the defendant would-not be exposed to multiple liabil-
ity.
129. The historical justification for overcharge damages was that without it,
because of the difficulty of proving lost profits, antitrust violators might escape
liability for their acts. See text accompanying notes 43-46 supra. Since, how-
ever, the aggregate lost profits claims of a chain of direct and indirect purchas-
ers could exceed an overcharge claim, a modern argument for overcharge
damages might be that it provides a logical upper limit on the defendant's po-
tential liability. In this sense, the overcharge measure would serve a purpose
similar to the proximate cause requirement imposed in negligence cases.
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profits were to replace illegal overcharge as the proper measure
of damages in price enhancement cases, the barriers to indi-
rect-purchaser standing cited by the Court in Illinois Brick
w-guld no longer exist. In addition, the compensatory effect re-
sulting from the use of the lost profits measure is far more ac-
curate than that which results from the use of the offensive
pass-on theory. With this in mind, the various methods of ap-
plying the lost profits measure in price enhancement cases are
examined in the next section.
IV. MODELS FOR MEASURING LOST PROFITS
A. THE TRADriTONAL MODELS
It is of little importance that lost profits is a more accurate
measure of the damages resulting from illegal price enhance-
ment if the amount of lost profit is unascertainable or highly
speculative. 30 It is particularly difficult to show lost profits, for
example, when the plaintiff, by making adjustments in other ar-
eas of its operations, or because of external economic influ-
ences, has maintained or steadily increased profits in spite of
anticompetitive activity.' 3 ' Equally difficult is the case in
which a firm's profits have declined during the period of the vi-
olation, but for reasons other than the violation. Economists
and lawyers have, however, developed a number of methods of
approximating the amount of lost profits even in these difficult
cases.
1. Before and After Method
The oldest132 damage calculation approach is called the
"before and after" method.133 As its name implies, the remedy
involves a comparison of a firm's profits before the violation
with its profits during the period of the violation. It apparently
was fashioned after early contract remedies,13 4 with its initial
antitrust application in Central Coal & Coke Co. v. Hartman.35
130. See text accompanying notes 35-39 supra.
131. See Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 492-93(1968).
132. See Hoyt, Dahl & Gibson, supra note 5, at 1233.
133. See E. TnvmERLAKE, supra note 5, at 317-28; Hoyt, Dahl & Gibson, supra
note 5, at 1233-36; Parker, Measuring Damages in Federal Treble Damage Ac-
tions, supra note 5, at 501-09.
134. See T. SEDGwICi, A T EATISE ON THE MEASuRE OF DAMAGES §§ 182, 183,
at 264-68 (8th ed. 1891), cited in Hoyt, Dahl & Gibson, supra note 5, at 1233 n. 7.
135. 111 F. 96, 99 (8th Cir. 1901) (dictum). See Parker, Measuring Damages
in Federal Treble Damage Actions, supra note 5, at 503.
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The before-and-after label is somewhat misleading, since it ac-
tually is unnecessary for the "before" and "after" periods to oc-
cur in any particular sequence. 136 All that is necessary is that
some normative period, whether before or after the violation
period-or even between two violation periods-can be identi-
fied and compared with the period of the violation. 3 7
Four conditions must exist before courts will permit appli-
cation of this measure of damages:
(a) The plaintiff's business must be one which was established and op-
erating prior to the impact of the conspiracy; (b) the prior earnings
must have been reasonably uniform; (c) the earnings during both peri-
ods must be in the same line of commerce; and (d) the earnings during
the prior period may not have been made when plaintiff was a partici-
pant in or beneficiary of the unlawful acts of defendant. 138
The relative importance of each of these conditions has been
the subject of some discussion, and it appears that a rigid appli-
cation of the first two conditions is of limited utility.13 9 In addi-
tion, an oversimplified application of the before-and-after
approach' 40 will not accurately detect damages if factors influ-
encing the firm's profits other than the anticompetitive activity
are constantly changing.
2. Yardstick Method
Another approach to lost profits calculation, the "yardstick"
method141 involves interfirm profit comparisons. Although this
method is frequently employed 4 2 and has received implicit
Supreme Court approval'43 its use is subject to severe limita-
tions. Ideally, the yardstick firm must not only be in the same
line of commerce as the plaintiff firm, but should duplicate both
the market share and the cost and demand conditions that the
plaintiff firm would have experienced in the absence of an-
136. See Parker, Measuring Damages in Federal Treble Damage Actions,
supra note 5, at 505-06.
137. Id.
138. E. TnviMBERLAKE, supra note 5, at 321.
139. Parker, Measuring Damages in Federal Treble Damage Actions, supra
note 5, at 505-07.
140. An oversimplified version of this method would be the comparison of
before and after profits with no attempt to adjust for variations in other factors
that might have had an impact on profits.
141. See E. TnvmERLAKE, supra note 5, at 328-33.
142. See cases cited in id., at 328-32.
143. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 257-60 (1946). In Bige-
low, both the before-and-after and the yardstick methods were employed.
From the language of the decision, however, it is difficult to ascertain the atti-
tude of the Court toward the yardstick method. See Parker, Measuring Dam-
ages in Federal Treble Damage Actions, supra note 5, at 509-10.
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ticompetitive activity.14 4 It is particularly difficult to identify a
firm conforming to these requirements if the anticompetitive
activity has had an industry-wide effect, 45 or if the only firms
escaping damage are those involved in the conspiratorial activ-
ity.46
3. Market Share Method
The most recently developed approach to lost profits calcu-
lation is the "market share" method.147 This measure evolved
in response to the inadequacy of the before-and-after and yard-
stick methods in cases in which the plaintiff was partially or to-
tally excluded from a market.4 8 In such cases, it is difficult to
identify a relevant normative period or to locate a satisfactory
yardstick firm.
Using this approach, one calculates damages by subtracting
the plaintiff's actual market share from the share it would have
achieved but for the anticompetitive conduct and multiplying
this difference by total market sales. This produces an esti-
mate of lost sales which is then multiplied by the plaintiff's av-
erage net profit. 49 In Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research,
Inc.,5 0 this methodology was employed to calculate the past
lost profits of a firm that had expected to increase its market
share but was unable to do so because of anticompetitive activ-
ity. The model can be adapted, however, for use in situations
in which a firm has lost a portion of its share of the market or
in which future profits will be lost due to market share dam-
age.' 5 '
B. THE REGRESSION MODEL
As noted earlier, the lost profits theory is not especially
useful unless the plaintiff's actual loss can be ascertained or ev-
idence exists from which its magnitude can be reasonably in-
144. See Hoyt, Dahl & Gibson, supra note 5, at 1237-39.
145. For example, a firm that was not a victim of the price-fixing activity
may have been able to increase its prices (and its profits) because of the "um-
brella" effect created when the victim firm was forced to raise its prices or ex-
perience lower profits. In such a situation, the non-victim firm is a poor
yardstick of what the victim firm's profits would have been in the absence of
price fixing.
146. E. TIMBERLAKE, supra note 5, at 332.
147. See generally Gibbons, upra note 5.
148. See id. at 743-45.
149. See id. at 749.
150. 401 U.S. 321 (1971). See generally Gibbons, supra note 5, at 748-50;
Hoyt, Dahl & Gibson, supra note 5, at 1241-47.
151. See Hoyt, Dahl & Gibson, supra note 5, at 1243-56.
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ferred.152 An accurate calculation of lost profits requires that
several variables, all of which have an independent effect on
profit, be identified and estimated. Once this separation of vari-
ables has been accomplished, the specific effect that the an-
ticompetitive activity has had on profits can be isolated. The
identification of these independent variables, of course, must
be based on sound economic theory. Economists have devel-
oped a statistical modelling technique called regression analy-
sis,153 which enables them to estimate the extent of the
independent effect these variables have on a dependent varia-
ble such as profit. The application of regression analysis to le-
gal and policy issues is not particularly novel.154 The following
discussion is designed to describe the rationale of regression
analysis and to illustrate its particular suitability for estimating
the lost profits resulting from illegal price enhancement.
In order to isolate the independent factors that affect prof-
its, an economist would first attempt to identify as many vari-
ables as possible that might influence the level of the firm's
profits. A simple computer program can reduce the relation-
ship between these "independent" variables and profit (the
"dependent" variable) to an equation called a regression equa-
tion. Figure VI illustrates a simple case in which only one in-
dependent variable-advertising expenditures-is used to
"explain" profits. The firm's annual profits are plotted along
the Y axis, and its advertising expenditures for the correspond-
ing years are plotted along the X axis. 55 A line that summa-
rizes the general relationship between the two variables can be
drawn through the points. When the line is fitted mathemati-
cally rather than by hand, it is done by minimizing the sum of
the squared differences between the line and the actual obser-
vations. 5 6 In Figure VI, the equation could be:
152. See text accompanying notes 35-42 supra.
153. See generally E. BRIGHAm & J. PAPPAS, supra note 96, at 137-55; J. MtJR-
PHY, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICs, 31-354 (1973).
154. See generally Benham, The Effect of Advertising on the Price of Eye-
glasses, 15 J.L. & ECON. 337 (1972); Beller, The Economics of Enforcement of an
Antidiscrimination Law: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 21 J. &
EcoN. 359 (1978); Finkelstein, Regression Models in Administrative Proceed-
ings, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1442 (1973); Landes, An Economic Study of U.S. Aircraft
Hijacking, 1961-1976, 21 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1978); Landes & Posner, Legal Precedent
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249 (1976); Parker, Eco-
nomics in the Courtroom: Proof of Damages in a Price-Fixing Case, supra note
5.
155. This example is based on a similar example presented in E. BRiGHAM &
J. PAPPAS, supra note 96, at 141-42.
156. The differences are squared because some of them will be negative and
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Pt = 10 + .5A t
where:
Pt = profit in year t
At = advertising expenditures in year t.
Advertising
Expenditure
Figure VI
The equation indicates that there will be a constant157 level of
profit of ten dollars when there are no advertising expendi-
tures, and that profit will increase by fifty cents for each addi-
tional dollar of advertising.
When several independent variables are used to explain
variation in a dependent variable, the graphical presentation
some positive. The process of squaring produces all positive numbers so that
they do not offset each other when totaled.
157. The constant term does little more than "position" the equation on the
Y axis. If an equation is developed from data that did not include zero values
for the independent variables, the constant term alone should not be relied on
for predictive purposes. See E. BmiGHs & J. PAPPAS, supra note 96, at 144.
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loses its usefulness, but the method of least squares can still be
used to fit a line that expresses the relationship between these
variables.
For example, a regression analysis of how several in-
dependent variables affect profit could produce an expression
similar to this: Pt = a + bYt - cMt - dFt + u
where:
Pt = profit in year t
Yt = national income in year t
Mt = an index representing the cost of materials in year
t158
Ft = a dummy variable' 59 which has the value of 0 if there
is no price fixing in year t and the value of 1 if there is
price fixing in year t
u = the residual effects of factors not included among the
independent variables.160
When actual data for several years are available, values can
be estimated for the constant term, a, and foi the coefficients b,
c, and d. The coefficients are estimates of the magnitude and
direction of each independent variable's influence on the de-
158. This index, of course, is not a variable that simply can be gleaned from
some published source as can the national income variable. Rather, the index
would be created by the economist constructing the regression model
159. The model, as presented, makes use of what is called a "dummy" varia-
ble to code for the existence or absence of price fixing. See J. MURmPy, supra
note 153, at 253. In a more complex regression model, a variable representing
the actual fixed price might be used instead of a "dummy" variable.
160. Although the equation as presented may be a reliable predictor of fu-
ture profits, it is designed merely to summarize the factors influencing profits
already earned. The Y term is used to summarize factors affecting demand, M
represents factors affecting supply. Both demand and supply, however, could
be represented by a more complex set of factors. For example, instead of Y,
one could use some measure of regional income, advertising expenditures,
and/or variables describing demographic characteristics of the market.
The model might be improved by using more than a single equation. The
use of a single equation involves the assumption that the values of the in-
dependent variables are determined exogenously. See E. BRIGHAM & J. PAPPAS,
supra note 96, at 536-39. A simple two-equation model could include one equa-
tion for demand and one equation for supply, see J. MURPHY, supra note 153, at
451-70, with both equations being solved simultaneously. As the model be-
comes more complex, it begins to simulate the actual decisionmaking behavior
of the firm.
It should also be noted that the equation presented in the text is linear in
form. In order to use the linear form, one must assume that the magnitude of
the influence of each independent variable is not affected by the values of the
other independent variables. When there is this type of interdependence be-
tween variables, a nonlinear model will more accurately describe the relation-
ship between the dependent and the independent variables.
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pendent variable. Suppose that the following equation were
derived:
Pt = 100 + .1Yt - 1OM t - 1000Ft.
This equation indicates that national income has a positive in-
fluence on profit, while the cost of materials and the existence
of price fixing both have negative influences. The estimated
magnitudes of these influences are indicated by the coeffi-
cients.
The equation is of little use, however, without certain addi-
tional information indicating the confidence that may be placed
in the model. One important measure is the coefficient of de-
termination, usually called R2 . The R2 figure indicates what
percentage of the observed variation in the dependent variable
(here profit) is explained by the variation of the independent
variables included in the equation.161 The higher the R2 , the
better the equation is for explaining the variation in profit from
year to year.
An additional confidence measure is the standard error of
the estimate (SEE). If predicted values for all the independent
variables in year t were substituted into the equation to calcu-
late a predicted profit level for year t, the SEE would supply
the information necessary to construct a confidence interval
around the predicted profit figure. For example, assume the
predicted profit is $20,000 and the SEE is $1,000. While $20,000
may not turn out to be the actual profit, there is a 68%
probability that the actual profit will fall between $20,000 ::
$1,000, a 95% probability that the actual profit will fall between
$20,000 _± $2,000, and a 99% probability that the actual profit will
fall between $20,000 ± $3,000.162
In addition to the standard error of the estimate, each coef-
ficient (in our case the values for b, c, and d) has a standard
error which is a measure of the coefficient's reliability. Assume
that the standard error for the national income coefficient is .02.
Thus, while .1 is only an estimated value for the coefficient,
161. R2 is the ratio of the amount of variation explained by the regression
equation to the total observed variation in the dependent variable. For exam-
ple, an R2 of 1.0 indicates that all observed variation can be explained by the
regression equation, while an R 2 of 0.5 indicates that fifty percent of the total
observed variation can be explained by the regression model. For a more de-
tailed explanation of the R2 statistic, see E. BRIGHAM & J. PAPPAS, supra note
96, at 145-48.
162. Standard error, as used here, connotes the same meaning as standard
deviation from the mean. The confidence intervals described in the text there-
fore rest on the assumption that the errors are normally distributed about the
mean value. See generally id. at 148-49.
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there is a 68% probability that the actual coefficient is .1 ± .02, a
95% probability that its actual value is .1 ± .04, and a 99%
probability that the actual value is .1 ± .06. Obviously, the
smaller the standard error of the coefficient, the more confi-
dence one can place in the magnitude of the estimated coeffi-
cient. The standard error of the coefficient also indicates how
confident one can be as to the direction of the influence of a
particular variable.163
Suppose the values in our hypothetical equation were gen-
erated using actual data for twenty periods, ten prior to the
price-fixing violation and ten during the violation. The model
could be used, through a type of "before and after" simulation,
to predict what profit would have been during the violation pe-
riod if the price fixing had not taken place. This computation
could be done for any particular year by substituting the actual
values for Y and M into the equation and assigning the price-
fixing dummy variable a value of zero to denote the absence of
price fixing.164 The difference between this predicted profit
level and the one that results when the equation is used to pre-
dict profit using the true value of 1 for the price-fixing dummy
variable would be the estimated lost profit for that particular
year.165 The confidence one would place in this lost profit esti-
mate depends on the R 2, the SEE, and the standard error of the
price-fixing coefficient.166
This example is certainly not intended to imply that a per-
163. Suppose the standard error for the national income coefficient is .04.
Can one reject at a 99% level of confidence the hypothesis that national income
has a negative as opposed to positive influence on profit? The 99% confidence
interval would be .1 ± .12, covering the range of values from -. 02 to .22. Thus,
one could not be 99% certain that the national income coefficient in our model
is evidence of a positive correlation between national income and the hypothet-
ical firm's profits. See generally id. at 149-50.
164. In the formulation presented in the text, all factors can be held con-
stant and the effect of price fixing isolated simply by removing the effect of the
dummy variable. In a more detailed model, see note 160 supra, the simulation
might be accomplished by substituting an estimated competitive price for the
collusive price variable.
165. One could also add the predicted profit for a particular year to the er-
ror for the year and subtract this from the actual profit for the year. The result
would be the same as that yielded by the procedure described in the text.
166. The standard error of the price-fixing coefficient is of particular impor-
tance. In our model, the estimated lost profits will always equal $1000. This is
because the "dummy" variable can take only the values 0 or 1, depending re-
spectively on the absence or presence of price fixing. A more complex model
would not, of course, be bound to such a consistent predictive pattern. If the
standard error of our price-fixing coefficient were $200, there would be a 68%
probability that actual losses were between $800 and $1200, a 95% probability
that they were between $600 and $1400, and a 99% probability that they were
between $400 and $1600.
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fect regression equation for calculating lost profits will always
be available. Sometimes, due to a low R 2, a high SEE, or a high
standard error for the price-fixing coefficient, it may not be pos-
sible to place a great deal of confidence in this type of analy-
sis.167 Likewise, the use of regression analysis requires one to
make certain assumptions that are not always entirely accu-
rate.168 Regression analysis remains, however, a useful method
of isolating the impact of anticompetitive activity on profit, and
the results can be presented in an understandable form.16 9 In
price enhancement cases, this method is clearly capable of gen-
erating lost profit estimates that would allow a jury to decide
the quantum of damages issue on the basis of a reasonable in-
ference.
V. CONCLUSION
The remedial scheme currently used by courts in price en-
hancement suits does little to match recoveries with the inci-
dence of overcharge-induced losses. To the extent that
antitrust recoveries should compensate victims, the overcharge
remedial scheme is inadequate. The pass-on adjustment, even
if coupled with standing for indirect purchasers, does not re-
lieve this inadequacy, since damages are still calculated as a
function of the defendant's unjust enrichment rather than the
plaintiffs actual losses. Furthermore, the pass-on adjustment
ignores the damages resulting from the decline in volume asso-
ciated with an overcharge. Lost profits is the only measure that
reflects actual damages including the losses associated with di-
minished volume.
In terms of antitrust objectives, however, the goal of deter-
ring anticompetitive activity is equally important as, if not
more important than, victim compensation. It has been argued
that to allow the pass-on defense and indirect-purchaser stand-
ing would limit the deterrent effect of treble-damage actions.o7 0
The same criticism can be leveled against the lost profits rem-
167. Economists generally experiment with several formulations before
finding the model that seems best to fit the data.
168. As noted earlier, the assumptions made in order to use the model
presented here are that 1) the values of all the independent variables are exo-
genously determined and 2) the change in one variable is unaffected by the
level of the other variables. In addition, construction of the confidence inter-
vals as described involves the assumption that the errors are normally distrib-
uted.
169. The results can be reported as predicted values with confidence inter-
vals.
170. See, e.g., Handier, supra note 6, at 1424-27.
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edy,171 but it loses much of its force once the critical differences
between the pass-on adjusted overcharge and lost profits reme-
dies are recognized. The pass-on remedy is premised on the
existence of an overcharge fund of predetermined magnitude,
which must be apportioned among all potential plaintiffs in a
vertical distribution or production chain. Under the lost profits
approach, the proof of damages issue does not entail claiming a
portion of a fixed overcharge fund. Thus, the proof of lost prof-
its by any plaintiff or class of plaintiffs would be completely in-
dependent of the proof of damages by plaintiffs at other levels
in the vertical chain. In addition, the aggregate lost profits
claim of the direct and indirect purchasers would be difficult
for a violator to predict and could far exceed the amount of the
gross overcharge. The lost profits remedy therefore has signifi-
cant deterrent potential while it also makes sense from the
standpoint of compensation.
This lost profits proposal is offered as a solution to the re-
medial problems that will surely arise if Hanover Shoe and Illi-
nois Brick are overruled by Congressional action.
Notwithstanding the possibility of Congressional action, how-
ever, the materials presented here suggest both a rationale and
a damage calculation methodology upon which the Supreme
Court might base a reconsideration of its holdings in these
cases. The Court's reliance on the gross overcharge measure is
the key to the Hanover Shoe-Illinois Brick problem. The meas-
ure is inconsistent with the goal of compensation and is not
necessarily the most advantageous form of deterrence. Contin-
ued reliance on the overcharge measure should be based on its
practical superiority. But the availability of sophisticated sta-
tistical tools and the evolution of the "reasonable inference"
standard of proof for lost profits indicate that the practical su-
periority of the overcharge remedy may be more imaginary
than real. Thus, the lost profits remedy not only is appealing
from the standpoint of economic theory, it also represents a
practical alternative to a seriously defective method of assess-
ing antitrust damages.
171. See R. PosNER, supra note 89, at 149. It is not completely clear whether
Professor Posner is criticizing the lost profits or pass-on adjusted overcharge
remedy. While he uses the term "lost profit," he combines it with an over-
charge recovery at the indirect purchaser level.
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